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Abstract
Over the past few years, many states have taken steps to ban smoking in public areas. The process of specific
polices spreading across state lines is called policy diffusion. Statewide anti-indoor smoking bans are utilized
to demonstrate what the most prevailing factors in policy diffusion are. A two-step approach to analysis is
implemented, first looking only at simple policy adoption among the 50 states, and secondly the rate at which
the policy expands across the country. A strong presence of local ordinances, nearby neighbors with statewide
bans in effect, and a history of smoking preemption laws are found to be the most statistically significant of a
list of variables. Because diffusion of this policy is entering its final stages, this research can be used as a
reference for designing and implementing policy diffusion studies in the future.
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76 1 RES PUB LICA 
NO SMOKING: POLICY DIFFUSION AND ITS PREVAILING FACTORS 
Brad Gresik 
Abstract· Over the past ]eIV years, lIlany states have taken steps to ban sllloking in public areas. The process of 
specific polices spreading across state lines is called poliry difjifSion. 5 tateJvide anti-indoor sllloking bans are utilized to 
demonstrate Ivhat the 1Il0st prevailingfactors ill poliry difjifSioll are. A hvo-step approach to analysis is implellleJIted, 
first looking only at simple poliry adoption among the 50 states, and secondly the rate at lvNch the poliry expands 
across the country. A strongpreseJIce of local ordinallces, nearby neighbors lvith statewide bans in effict, and a history of 
smokingpreelllptioll laws are found to be the most statistically significant of a list of vaJiables. Because difjilsion of this 
poliry is entering its final stages, this research can be used as a refirence for designing and implementingpoliry difjilsioll 
studies in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
Good ideas simply do not materialize as law in every state. Instead, these ideas slowly spread 
from state to state based on a variety of internal and external factors, a process called policy 
diffusion.170 The phenomenon of progressive ideas spreading due to specific circumstances has long 
been debated by scholars, generally requiring a two-fold examination to understand a policy's 
diffusion. First, one must compare the circumstances of states that have adopted or not adopted the 
policy in question. Once that is established, it becomes necessary to examine why a policy diffused so 
rapidly in some states and lagged in others. The aim of this research is to determine both of these 
components in regard to Anti-Indoor Smoking Bans CAISBs). 
AISBs are important to the study of policy diffusion because they can be broadly applied as 
a model for the study as a whole. This is due to the pressure to pass an AISB coming from different 
levels of federalism. In the past, the push has primarily been from local and state pressure, but as of 
September 2013, federal funding is now being put towards anti-smoking policies. AISBs also 
represent a policy which is still diffusing. For example, Indiana passed a comprehensive AISB in July 
of2012, a full 17 years after Utah pioneered the policy in 1995.'71 AISBs also are important to 
examine because they are "fact-based" rather than a "moral-based" policies.172 For instance, a state 
policymaker can look at same-sex marriage and be morally opposed to it, and in their mindset, have a 
reasonable rationale for excluding that policy. Smoking leading to cancer, heart failure, and stroke is 
something that is an accepted fact in the majority of U.S., which therefore represents an interesting 
take on how a baseline policy can be diffused. Due to these factors, this research can be used as a 
jumping off point for other studies in the future and as a point of comparison. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A compelling diffusion analogy once observed that "a sense of political 'Stockholm 
Syndrome' exists, where a piece of radical legislation gets passed by the Swedes, then it's flown 
directly to the U.S. and is passed into law in California. Then it's flown to Wisconsin. Then to New 
170 Shipan and Volden 2006 
171 Americans For Non-Smokers' Rights 2013 
172 Shipan and Volden 2006 
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York. By the time it gets to Mississippi, which is about four years later, it's a national birthright.
,,173 
This idea of policy diffusion was fIrst widely made popular with Jack L. Walker Jr.'s 1969 
groundbreaking work "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States," which still stands 
as a cornerstone of diffusion research.!74 Walker proposed the idea that the country has several 
competitive regional leaders that emulate each other so as not to appear left behind. Using dozens of 
different cases, Walker classifIed states as leaders, pioneers, and followers, defIning their role in the 
diffusion process while leaving many questions to future scholars. Some of these pivotal questions 
include what actually makes a state more or less prone to new ideas, and what is the biggest 
determinant of adoption probability. 
Virginia Gray began to tackle this problem in the years following Walker's work and began 
to better frame the question researchers need to examine. By looking at several different policies 
across what V.O. Key called the "have�not spectrum" including education, welfare, and civil rights, 
Gray determined that it is almost impossible to fInd a catch-all diffusion model that will inherently 
help defIne all future studies. 175 Most importantly, she found that all examinations of policy passage 
need to be observed as time�specifIc, noting that states can change dramatically in as little as a 
decade. Also emphasized was the importance of differing levels of federalism, as policy diffusion 
trends looked completely different in cases where, for example, federal influence was exerted rather 
than just state and local influence. Finally noted was the importance of current political and 
economic conditions of the state during the tirne of passage. For example, a unifIed legislature 
combined with a strong current economy might provide incentive to pass a politically turbulent 
policy where before it might have been overlooked. 
In a direct response to Gray three years later, Robert Eyestone claimed that it would be 
irrational to dismiss policy diffusion as a case�specifIc phenomenon and identifIed key trends that 
drive policy diffusion. Most importantly, it was found that even when a multitude of different 
policies were controlled for, several states were always leaders in early adoption. However, as 
Eyestone notes, "Diffusion patterns may record the spread by necessity rather than the emulation of 
virtue: leaders may lead because they are also the fIrst to suffer industrial growth which creates 
demands for state policy responses.,,!76 Eyestone summarizes that for policy diffusion to be truly 
understood, it must be battered with a multitude of independent variables, as the interactions 
between many allow the true result to reveal themselves. The main message is that for diffusion to be 
understood, many different models with the same policy must be run. A method which can be 
173 Shaw and Renner 2002 
174 Jack L.Walker 1973 
175 Grey 1973 
176 Eyestone 1977 
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inferred from these authors suggests examining both simple adoption of a policy and then going 
back and surveying the rate at wltich that policy was adopted. Without both parts of the puzzle, the 
full story remains obfuscated. 
The next major contribution in policy diffusion theory came with Berry and Berry's 1990 
diffusion analysis. By using the policy of state lottery adoptions, they determined that many previous 
studies had completely ignored the impact of internal factors, such as state legislature and local 
municipality makeup, and external factors, such as the number of nearby state powers with similar 
policies. The usage of a less controversial topic like lotteries as opposed to something more heated 
like gun control also provided future scholars the ability to look at these two different categories as 
separate beasts. In a nutshell, Berry and Berry proved to be ground breaking due to the fact that they 
had concrete proof of three principles: "the probability of state innovation is direcdy related to the 
motivation to innovate, inversely related to the strength of obstacles, and direcdy related to the 
availability of resources for overcoming these obstacles."m This not only confIrms that both Virginia 
and Gray were correct in their papers, but also gave more context to Walker's fIrst proposal. Due to 
the establishment of defInite diffusion facts, Berry and Berry'S article is easily one of the most cited 
research endeavors in the fIeld of policy diffusion. 
While the evaluation of macro-influences were being gauged and discussed, several scholars 
such as John Kingdon and Michael Mintrom took a micro-approach to policy diffusion via the 
importance of policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs can be defIned as "people who seek to 
initiate dynamic policy change.,,178 In layman's terms, this comes down to individual politicians, 
grassroots organizations, and lobbying institutions. Both Kingdon and Mintrom arrive at the 
conclusion that policy diffusion absolutely ltinges on the success or failure of these groups in making 
their case to legislatures and the public.l79 Even when controlled across several policies and time, it 
was found that effectiveness of policy innovators is statistically signifIcant. Ignoring them would 
deprive a study of getting the full scope of what is occurring during the moment of policy 
diffusion. ISO 
One interesting method that had not been considered was the notion of examining polices 
that do not get adopted and comparing them to those which do. Craig Volden took tltis approach, 
and his fIndings were quite strong in reaffIrming many central tenets of policy diffusion. Firsdy, he 
noted that polices that do gain national and regional momentum usually have a watershed moment, 
during wltich they gain traction and are adopted by many states in a very short period of time. Those 
177 Berry and Berry 1990 
178 Kingdon 1984 
179 wfintrom 1997 
180 Mintrom et al. 1997 
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that do not typically have a very slow start and tend to lead nowhere. When looking at children's 
health insurance programs, Volden also found that while diffusion does typically occur regionally 
with leaders taking the initiatives fIrst, diffusion occurs most rapidly between states that are located 
geographically close while simultaneously having a similar economic and political makeup. IS! 
The most relevant literature in regard to this research paper comes from Shipan and Volden 
in 2006.182 They were the fIrst to attempt to solely look at AISBs and attempt to explain their 
diffusion across state lines. This work is signifIcant as it identifIes what makes up an AISB and labels 
smoking as a fact-based policy. They also utilized the idea of the watershed moment and were able to 
successfully create a working model of policy diffusion incorporating many of the lessons learned by 
earlier diffusion scholars. These lessons include incorporating regional importance, policy 
entrepreneurs, and several unique models. However, their models missed several key variables, such 
as constituent makeup, and they exanrined the policy when it was still very young. To put in 
perspective, over 20 states have adopted AISBs since 2006, which indicates that the study completely 
missed the rapid watershed phase; in fact, it had only just begun.183 
HYPOTHESES 
My hypotheses for this project reflect the two-stage design explained in the literature review. 
My fIrst hypothesis examines strictly policy adoption. The second looks at those states that as of 
October 2013 already have policies in place, and assesses the rate in which the policies were passed. 
Hi: Having a signifIcant percentage of the population already covered by AISB local ordinances will 
lead to a state adopting a comprehensive AISB. 
H2a: Geographical closeness to leader states will be the leading cause the rate of AISB to increase. 
H2b: Internal state features will be the leading cause of AISB adoptions. 
METHODOLGY 
This research is based on a combination and adaption of the tests administered by Shipan and 
Volden (2006) as well as Berry and Berry (1990). I will examine all 50 states and their adoption of 
AISBs between 1995- September 2013. The fIrst module will be a simple Pearson's r to determine if 
there is any connection at all between the two dependent variables that will be tested, policy adoption 
and rate of adoption. Next a binary logistic regression will be implemented with policy adoption as 
the dependent variable. These results will then be compared with the fmal module, which is an 
ordinary least squares regression with the rate. I observe rate of adoption in terms of simple years 
and do not utilize months, so a policy passed in November 2008 and December of that same year 
will receive the same score of 13 years. 
181 Volden 2006 
182 Shipan and Volden 2006 
183 Ibid. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
As stated earlier, this research relies on two different dependent variables and the evaluation 
of both of them to get the full picture of policy diffusion. My fIrst of these variables, Policy 
Adoption, is simply a dummy variable which assigns a 1 to states which have a statewide 
comprehensive AISB. Given consideration to the literature and how similar policies can carry the 
same theme, a state will be evaluated to have an AISB if they have 2/3 of the parts necessary to have 
what is considered a comprehensive smoke-free state: 100 percent smoke-free non-hospitality 
workplaces, 100 percent smoke-free restaurants, and/or 100 percent smoke-free bars184• My second 
dependent variable is named Rate of Adoption. The rate of adoption is the number of years that have 
passed since the fIrst statewide AISB took place in 1995.!85 I am counting the years since the fIrst 
case, not months. Due to the serious chance of data overlap and inconsistency with several other 
independent variables that rely on the date being accurate, I believe simpler is better in this case and 
paints a more accurate picture. 
One of the most critical intervening variables being analyzed is one which captures the 
pressure of local laws and ordinances. Retrieving these data was an arduous task, and was drawn by 
adding up the overall percentage of a state's population already covered by local AISBs in place the 
day that the statewide comprehensive AISB took effect. A chronological table of state and local 
AISB laws!86 along with a percentage chart of U.S. population covered by 100 percent Smoke-Free 
laws were examined, which allowed a Proportion of State Population with Local Restrictions variable 
to be generated.!87 By using multiple data sources, I was able to avoid double counting data for cases 
that might have overlapped (like Sacramento versus Sacramento County laws). If a state does not 
have an AISB in place, I used the percentage as of October 2013. 
The proximity variables were measured by breaking the concept into two parts to capture 
the idea of geographical pressure influencing policy diffusion. First, I looked at regional adoption. I 
did this by dividing the country into 4 semi-homogeneous partitions based off the Census Bureau's 
regional map. The regions used are West (including Hawaii and Alaska), Midwest, South, and 
Northeast. I then counted the number of states in that given region that had an AISB in place when 
the state being examined passed theirs and divide by the total of regional states minus one to account 
for the state itself. This culminates to the production of a Regional Adoption variable. For example, 
Florida would receive a .083 because 1/12 of the other southern states already had a comprehensive 
AISB in place. I implement a similar scheme for the Bordering State Adoption variable as similarly 
184 Americans For Non-S mokers' Rights 2013 
185 Ibid. 
186 Americans For Non-S mokers' Rights 2013 
187 Ibid. 
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implemented by Shipan and Volden (2006).188 A state receives this score based on the percentage of 
states that share any direct border with the state being examined. This information was collected 
from the Americans for Non-Smokers' Rights interest group. 
To capture internal state governance similarities, I use a variety of variables. First, I 
implement the Legislative Professionalism variable, and use the Squire scale and direcdy place every 
state's 2003 legislative professionalism score into SPSS. Legislative professionalism scores are based 
on a variety of things, such as how many days the general assembly is in session. The result of this 
process is states like California, whose state legislature essentially prepares policymakers for the 
national political scene, receive a higher score than places like Idaho, where the legislature is very 
speed orientated and lawmakers are more lax. Next I use the Congressional Quarterly Political 
Encyclopedia of U.S. States and Regions to look at my Democrat and Republican Unity dummy 
variable. For a state to score a 1, the year their AISB was passed both upper and lower house along 
with the governor must be from the same party. ISO If the state has not passed an AISB, I use October 
2013 as the date to record. I also use a dummy variable I call Historical Preemption, again drawing 
from the Americans for Non-Smokers' Rights database and give a state a 1 if they have had any kind 
of AISB preemption law since 1995, when the fIrst statewide ban took effect until October 2013, the 
cutoff date for my model. Finally, I used the variable Government Ideology to capture government 
preferences, as opposed to constituent ones, because "all else equal, a more liberal government 
prefers a higher level of government activism.,,190 I use the historical state score from Berry et al. 
(2010) to determine the fIgure and use the date of when a state passed an AISB. For those states that 
passed statewide AISBs after 2010, I referred to Richard C. Fording's database, which has the 
updated fIgures until October 2013. For those states who do not have a statewide AISB, I used the 
October 2013 score.l91 
I then turn my attention to the people that comprise the state, and insert several variables 
based on their traits. I use Berry et al.'s citizen ideology score to represent the constituents in a 
stateln I direcdy place this score (from dle year the AISB was placed or October 2013 if none) into 
SPSS and named it Citizen Ideology. I also examine historical median income from the US Census 
Bureau and use a similar measure of entry into SPPS, again using the dates an AISB was in place (or 
October 2013 if none) I call this variable Median Income.l93 
188 Shipan and Volden 2006 
189 Winkler 2008 
190 Volden 2006 
191 Fording 2013 
192 Berry and Berry 1990 
193 US Census Bureau 2013 
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Tobacco usage and production must also be considered when looking at anything related to 
anti-smoking. I used historical smoking rates from when a state passed an AISB or 2013 if AISBs 
were not present. I obtained this information from the American Lung Association. I named the 
created variable Smoker Percentage. To capture the idea of a tobacco producing state and the 
ramifications, I use a dummy variable called Tobacco Producing State, and give a 1 to those states 
which grow or produce tobacco products and 0 to those who do not. 
Finally I construct two opposite variables which examine lobbyist influence in a state and 
name them Tobacco 1.JJbby Percentage and Health 1.JJbby Percentage. The figures are taken from a 1996 
snapshot study conducted by Goldstein and Bearman. The measure is "a ratio of the number of 
health (or tobacco) lobbyists in the state to the total number of registered lobbyists present.,,194 
Together I believe these variables accurately reflect the many scholars who wrote diffusion literature 
recommend as a "comprehensive analysis of policy diffusion," and truly capture the whole picture of 
what is happening in statewide comprehensive anti-indoor smoking bans. 
RESULTS 
Table 1: Pearson's r correlation 
Policy Years 
Policy & Median income (-.369**) Years & Percent Region (.689**) 
Policy & South (-.646**) Years & Percent Touch (.439**) 
Policy & Citizen ID (.564**) Years & Uni. Republicans (-.351*) 
Policy & T. Producing State (-.305*) Years & Percent Smokers (.632**) 
Policy & Percent Smokers (-.444*) **-.05 *-.01 
Table 1 is the statistically significant Pearson's r correlations between the two dependent 
variables in the equation. Between both simple policy adoption and adoption rate, the only common 
correlation between the two was Percent Smokers. It has a negative correlation at -.444 and was 
statistically significant at the .05 level for policy adoption, meaning more smokers will lead to less of a 
chance for an AISB to be in place in that state. For adoption rate, Percent Smokers had a positive 
correlation of .632 and was actually significant at the .01 level. Other statistically significant adoption 
rate correlations included median income, south, citizen ideology, and if the state is a tobacco­
producing one. Adoption rate correlations appeared to be based along geographical lines, with both 
my proximity variables of regional adoption and direct border state adoption variables were 
statistically significant at the .01 level. To no one's surprise, there was a negative correlation between 
unified republicans and the adoption rate of AISBs. Most notably absent from both policy and years 
were the variables Unified Democrats and Government Ideology, which in this early test might signal 
that in this particular policy, constituent makeup matters more than governmental. 
194 Goldstein and Bearman 1996 
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Table 2: Binary logistic regression of simple policy adoption 
Model Exp(B) Sig. 
Constant .009 .25 
Municipality .928 .049* 
Professionalism 1.03 .679 
Unified Republicans .102 .234 
Unified Democrats 6.85 .293 
Citizen Ideology 1.215 .015* 
Government Ideology .938 .110 
Tobacco Producer .90 .066 
Preemption History 1.470 .836 
Median Income 1.056 .593 
R2 - .735 
Table 2 represents my first stage of policy diffusion. The dependent variable in this binary 
logistic regression was whether or not a state simply had a comprehensive AISB or not. The R2 was 
.735, which allows us to say that the model explains 73.5 percent of the variance in the dependent 
variable. Of the variables listed above, only the percentage of state covered by local ordinances and 
citizen ideology were statistically significant at the .05 level (.049 and .015 respectively). 
Professionalism, unified democrats and republicans, government ideology, if the state was a 
tobacco producer, preemption of AISBs, and median income were all statistically insignificant. These 
initial findings appear to be in line with what other researchers have found to be primary 
determinants of policy diffusion but with several key exceptions. All of the factors which represent 
state-level influences, such as government ideology and unified legislatures played zero role in 
determining the passage of a statewide AISB. The influence of municipality passage also appears to 
have diminished since Shipan and Volden's similar endeavor in 2006, which across the board found 
.01 significance level, most notably with local ordinances. 
841RES PUBLICA 
T hi 3 OLS a e : regresslOn 0 : po c a optlon rates. f li d 
Model T-Score 
Constant .992 
Municipality 1.072 
Percent Region 2.372 
Percent Touching .377 
Professionalism -1.904 
Median Income -.344 
Unified Republican -.643 
Unified Democrat 1.016 
South 1.687 
Preemption -2.12 
Citizen Ideology -.207 
Government Ideology -.274 
Tobacco Producer .864 
Percentage Smokers .869 
Tobacco Lobby -.51 
Health Lobby 1.711 
R2 - .765 
Sig. 
.333 
.296 
.028* 
.71 
.071 
.735 
.527 
.322 
.107 
.047* 
.838 
.787 
.398 
.395 
.615 
.100 
Std. Error of the Ewmate - 2.165 
Table 3 is the second step in analyzing policy diffusion, this time using rate of adoption with 
those states which have an AISB in place as the dependent variable. To calculate this, a filter was 
implemented to only look at states that registered policy = 1 on SPSS, resulting in an N of 36. Again, 
a high R2 was observed, specifically .765, which gives a high amount of confidence. Surprisingly, this 
time the percentage of citizens with a local ordinance and citizen ideology were not statistically 
significant. This time municipality had a causal effect of .296 and citizen ideology was observed at 
.838. What was statistically significant, however, was the percentage of states already with an AISB in 
place when the case state adopted, along with a negative correlation with states that have had a 
history of AISB preemption laws in place. Again, unified Democrats and Republicans did not come 
up as statistically significant and were observed at .322 and .527 respectively. Surprisingly, the 
variables for Tobacco and Health Lobby both were not statistically significant, with the former 
coming in at .615 and the latter at .102. Percentage smokers and tobacco being produced in a state 
both were also statistically insignificant despite the percentage of state smokers being so strongly 
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related in the last model that it had to be removed. The percentage of smokers in a state was only 
.395 and production was .615. During this step of the evaluation of AISBs, regionalism percentage 
and history of preemption laws were statistically sigoificant at the .05 level, with regionalism at .028 
and preemption .047. Although the regionalism score was sigoificant, the bordering score was not. 
This is noteworthy because it implies that the defmition of state neighbors must be expanded to 
include more than those states which share a direct border. 
Figure 1: A frequency table of state adoption rates 
m !l.ln ?.no am fI� IrJ.Q!l n.oo l:l.oo 13m 1.':.00 15.00 nJD 
'if6;))" 
I included this figure to again reaffIrm Volden's hypothesis that a watershed moment exists 
where a policy will rapidly diffuse and gain national momentum causing late adopters, or "followers" 
such as Wisconsin, to adopt a specific policy.l95 2005-2009 appears to be that time period, as there 
was an explosion of diffusion that as of 2013 has appeared to have completely dissipated. Finally, it 
can be inferred through this observation that the states that have not yet adopted (the majority of 
them being in the south) will never do so given the current influencers both inside and around their 
state. 
CONCLUSION 
My initial hypotheses for my two-step approach to policy diffusion were only partially 
conHrmed. For simple policy adoption, having a larger percentage of people already covered by local 
ordinances was statistically sigoiHcant, but that was only when coupled with several other distinct 
variables. As mentioned above, placing the variable of historical smoker population percentages 
completely skewed the results. On top of that, the sigoiHcance level was only .049. If any other 
southern state were to adopt a comprehensive AISB, I imagine that local pressure would no longer 
become statistically sigoiHcant. I was also incorrect about having a multitude of underlying state 
195 Volden 2006 
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features affecting adoption. All of my other variables attempting to control for government 
preference and capacity fell flat. I do know however (due to my Pearson's r correlation) that there is a 
lot more going on with adoption of AISBs, as median income, being a southern state, and citizen 
ideology all were significant at the .01 level. Perhaps future researchers can construct more focused 
regressions to figure out what I am missing and account for the lost variables. 
My evaluation of statewide AISB adoption rates yielded similar contradictions with my 
hypotheses and data. I was correct in my estimate that geographical proximity would play a key patt 
in determining policy diffusion, but I expected a state sharing a direct border with an AISB state 
would be more significant than regionalism percentage. The opposite actually occurred, with 
regionalism having a significance rate of .028 and sharing a direct border only being .71. Again it 
appeared that state legislature makeup had no effect on policy diffusion at the state level. The only 
other factor that was actually significant at the .05 level was having a history of AISB preemption, 
which therefore likely threw off the municipality numbers because it was illegal for local governments 
to have them. Based on my Pearson's r correlation between adoption rates and percentage of a state's 
smoking population being .632, I strongly expected that result to shine through in my OLS 
regression. Seeing another lost variable, I ran another regression with just variables significant at the 
.1 level and nothing carne back as statistically significant. This therefore reaffirmed Berry and Berry's 
1990 conclusion that for policy diffusion to be analyzed, there needs to be a multitude of 
independent variables. Comparing the two independent variables' results show that many different 
forces are at play when polices diffuse, and ignoring a two-step procedure leaves out much of the 
story. 
According to my frequency chart, policy diffusion for statewide comprehensive anti-indoor 
smoking bans appears to be at its end. Unfortunately for this study, federal influence on this policy 
did not begin until September 2013, with a national ad campaign from the Center for Disease 
Control (CDC) aimed at curbing tobacco usage called "Tips from Former Smokers.,,!96 The full 
impact of this new federal initiative has not been recorded on states that do not have a 
comprehensive AISB and it is likely that it might tip the scale toward adopting legislation. This 
research can therefore be interpreted as the result of state and local government, as the diffusion is 
appears to be largely completed. In the coming months when such federal spending can be coded, 
future researchers can use this document to provide insight on how to explain policy diffusion. 
196 Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2013 
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